

Situation Report:  
**February 25, 2026**

# Mexico Security Crisis & Supply Chain Impact Assessment

The Killing of CJNG Leader “El Mencho” and Cascading Effects on Critical Trade Infrastructure

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# Mexico Security Crisis & Supply Chain Impact Assessment

## The Killing Of CJNG Leader “El Mencho” And Cascading Effects On Critical Trade Infrastructure

### ● Executive Summary

#### CRITICAL EVENT: 22 FEBRUARY 2026

Nemesio “El Mencho” Oseguera Cervantes, leader of the CJNG (Mexico’s most powerful drug trafficking organization) was killed during a Mexican Army operation in Tapalpa, Jalisco. The CJNG launched coordinated retaliatory violence across 20+ states: 250+ road blockades, vehicle and business arson, and attacks killing 25 National Guard members. Over 70 people have died in the operation and its aftermath.

#### COMPOUNDING EVENT: U.S. WINTER STORM (22–24 FEB 2026)

The Mexico security shock coincides with a U.S. East Coast and Gulf blizzard that disrupted port operations from 22–24 February. U.S. ports are still in a backlog-clearance phase, reducing spare capacity. The combined effect increases the probability of service-level misses and expedited freight cost spikes into early March.

Mexico is the United States’ largest trading partner, with bilateral goods trade exceeding US\$731 billion through Q3 2025 (approximately 16% of all U.S. trade). The supply chain risk is concentrated in three connected bottlenecks that form a cascading constraint chain.

- 1. Inland corridor constraint (dominant):** 250+ road blockades severed the Manzanillo–Guadalajara–Bajío corridor. Even with the port operating, containers cannot reliably move inland.
- 2. Port gate productivity (secondary):** Manzanillo reopened under Navy security but with slower gate movements and controlled access. Yard velocity and truck-out capacity are the practical constraints.
- 3. Border crossing throughput (tertiary but critical):** CBP data shows that the World Trade Bridge and Colombia Solidarity Bridge were closed on 25 Feb. Upstream corridor disruption, carrier selectivity, and customs system outages (precedent: Nuevo Laredo failure on 18 Feb) create “stop–go capacity” risk.

## Impact-at-a-Glance

Dimension	Severity	Key Details
<b>Port of Manzanillo</b>	HIGH	Temporarily closed Feb 22; reopened under Navy guard. Handles 45% of Pacific containerised imports and 20–25% of Mexico’s total maritime trade. Container backlog building; gate moves slower under security controls.
<b>Guadalajara Airport (GDL)</b>	HIGH	5th largest cargo airport in Latin America. 25% flights cancelled, 22% delayed on Feb 22. Freighter operations grounded, access roads blocked.
<b>Western Mexico Highways</b>	HIGH	250+ blockades across 20+ states. Guadalajara–Colima, Guadalajara–Morelia routes severed. Military checkpoints restrict throughput.
<b>U.S.–Mexico Border Crossings</b>	MODERATE-HIGH	CBP data (25 Feb): World Trade Bridge and Colombia Solidarity Bridge closed. Bridge of Americas cargo facility closed. Laredo Bridge II open, no delay. “Stop-go capacity” pattern, not stable throughput.
<b>Manufacturing (JIT)</b>	MODERATE-HIGH	Auto parts and electronics from Manzanillo corridor disrupted. Shifts cancelled in Tamaulipas. If instability persists more than a week, U.S. assembly lines face line-stoppage risk.
<b>U.S. System Capacity</b>	ELEVATED	U.S. East Coast/Gulf ports clearing winter storm backlogs. Reduced rerouting flexibility. Equipment imbalance (chassis, trucks) compounds Mexico delays.
<b>Mexico City Gateways</b>	LOW	Felipe Angeles and Mexico City airports operating normally. Last-mile delivery to affected states challenged.

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## 1. Situation Analysis: The Drug War Status Quo

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### 1.1 The Triggering Event

On 22 February 2026, the Mexican Army, supported by the National Guard, Mexican Air Force, and U.S. intelligence through the Joint Interagency Task Force-Counter Cartel (JITC-CC), conducted a raid on a rural compound in Tapalpa, Jalisco.

Oseguera Cervantes (“El Mencho”) and two bodyguards attempted to flee into a wooded area, where they were fatally shot. In the operation and ensuing violence, over 70 people were killed, including 25 National Guard members across six separate attacks in Jalisco. The CJNG’s right-hand man, Hugo César Macías Ureña (“El Tuli”), was subsequently killed while attempting to flee El Grullo, Jalisco, after reportedly offering MX\$20,000 per soldier killed.

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### 1.2 The Cartel Landscape

Mexico’s security environment is defined by the dominance of two nationally operating cartels: the Sinaloa Cartel and the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG). The CJNG operates in 28 of Mexico’s 32 states, while the Sinaloa Cartel operates in 24, with 18 states actively contested between them.

A 2022 study by the think tank *Lantia* identified 442 criminal groups across Mexico. Organized criminal groups now operate in 81% of Mexican municipalities.

The Sinaloa Cartel has been in internal turmoil since the 2024 arrest of co-founder Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada, who pleaded guilty in August 2025. With the CJNG now similarly decapitated and with no clear successor (El Mencho’s brother, son, and daughter are all in U.S. custody) analysts expect a succession war among regional CJNG commanders.

Both of Mexico’s dominant cartels are now simultaneously destabilized, an unprecedented situation.

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### 1.3 Geopolitical Context

In February 2025, the Trump administration designated both the CJNG and the Sinaloa Cartel as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). This designation requires financial institutions and companies linked to the U.S. financial system to freeze and report any assets tied to these organizations.

FinCEN has issued geographic targeting orders requiring enhanced reporting on cash transactions in border towns at a \$200 threshold (versus the normal \$10,000). The FTO designation also introduces material support liability under U.S. law.

President Claudia Sheinbaum’s government faces enormous pressure from Washington to demonstrate results against drug trafficking. Mexico is scheduled to host the FIFA World Cup in June 2026, with Guadalajara serving as a host city expecting approximately 3 million visitors. The upcoming USMCA review in 2026 adds further uncertainty to the bilateral trade relationship.

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### 1.4 The Violence Trajectory

The killing of El Mencho follows a well-documented pattern: removal of a cartel’s senior leader triggers fragmentation and inter-factional warfare. The 2006–2012 Calderón-era military offensive captured or killed several major drug lords but produced more violence, not less. The economic cost of violence in Mexico reached an estimated US\$273 billion in 2024, equivalent to 14.7% of GDP. Mexico’s homicide rate stood at 25.6 per 100,000 inhabitants, more than four times the OECD average.

## 2. Supply Chain Impact Assessment

### 2.1 Critical Logistics Nodes: Infrastructure Disruption Matrix

Status as of 22–25 February 2026, based on operator advisories and government reporting

Node	Road	Air	Sea	Current Status (25 Feb)
Guadalajara	SEVERED	DISRUPTED	N/A (inland)	Roads clearing with debris; military checkpoints slow throughput. GDL airport normalizing under guard. Warehouses reopening with staffing gaps.
Manzanillo Port	BLOCKED	MINOR	REOPEN (slow)	Reopened under Navy guard. Protection Level I with drones, patrols, controlled access. Backlog building; yard velocity constrained.
Puerto Vallarta	BLOCKED	SHUT DOWN	N/A	100% flights cancelled Feb 22. Airlines slowly resuming. Tourism paralysed.
Laredo / Nuevo Laredo	MIXED	N/A	N/A	Bridge II: open, no delay. World Trade Bridge: closed. Colombia Solidarity: closed. Customs outage precedent 18 Feb.
El Paso / Juárez	MIXED	N/A	N/A	Bridge of Americas cargo facility: closed. Other lanes: update pending. Capacity tightening.
Reynosa / McAllen	DISRUPTED	DISRUPTED	N/A	Roads to airport and bridges: blocked by cartel. International bridges: technically open but access routes compromised.
Mexico City	NORMAL	NORMAL	N/A	Both airports are operating normally. Delivery/pickup to affected states challenged.

### 2.2 Port of Manzanillo: Critical Chokepoint (IMF PortWatch Intelligence)

The Port of Manzanillo (UN/LOCODE: MX ZLO) is Mexico's most critical Pacific gateway, handling approximately 45% of all containerised imports arriving by sea and accounting for 20–25% of Mexico's total maritime imports and exports during 2019–2025.

Its disruption has immediate national and transnational significance.

Manzanillo Port Profile (IMF PortWatch Data)

Attribute	Detail
Top Traded Industries	Mineral products, vegetable products, chemical & allied industries
Vessel Mix	Container ships: ~62%   Dry-bulk: ~19%   Tankers: ~12%   General cargo: ~4%   Ro-Ro: ~2%
Key Upstream Ports	Busan (Korea), Lázaro Cárdenas (Mexico), Ensenada (Mexico), Shanghai Yangshan (China), Balboa (Panama)
Key Downstream Ports	Lázaro Cárdenas, Los Angeles–Long Beach (USA), Balboa (Panama), Yokohama (Japan), Puerto Quetzal (Guatemala)
National Share	20–25% of Mexico's total maritime imports and exports (2019–2025 average)

The port was temporarily closed on February 22. Although it has since reopened under Naval protection, the practical constraint is yard velocity and truck-out capacity under security controls. Short closures create multi-day recovery tails when inland evacuation is constrained: containers accumulate in-yard with nowhere to go. The upstream/downstream port network means disruptions at Manzanillo can ripple to Lázaro Cárdenas, Los Angeles–Long Beach, and Panama transshipment hubs, as vessels skip calls or reorder schedules.

Alternative Mexican ports, Lázaro Cárdenas (Pacific) and Altamira (Gulf), can absorb some volume, but if violence continues across western states, diverted flows face inland corridor and security friction.

## 2.3 Guadalajara: Manufacturing & Distribution Hub

Guadalajara is Mexico's second-largest city and a major manufacturing and technology hub. Its international airport (GDL) ranks as the 5th largest cargo airport in Latin America.

On February 22, the Jalisco Governor activated a "Code Red." Public transportation was suspended statewide. Approximately 49 flights (25%) were cancelled and 42 (22%) delayed. Freight cargo operations were grounded. Warehouse operations were effectively closed. By February 23, the airport was reopening under military security, but cargo handling faces staffing and access challenges.

## 2.4 U.S.–Mexico Border Crossings: CBP Live Status Intelligence

CBP wait-time API data as of 25 February 2026 (03:32 AM CST) reveals a more severe picture than initial "open but tightening" assessments suggested. Several commercial freight crossings are fully closed.

*Border Crossing Status (CBP Wait-Time API, 25 Feb 2026)*

Crossing	Status	Commercial Lanes	Implication
Laredo — Bridge II	OPEN	Active, no delay (02:00 CST)	Sole functional Laredo freight crossing at time of reporting.
Laredo — World Trade Bridge	CLOSED	All commercial lanes shut	Primary high-volume freight crossing. Closure severely limits JIT deliveries for automotive and electronics.
Laredo — Colombia Solidarity	CLOSED	All commercial lanes shut	Secondary commercial bridge. Combined closure with WTB eliminates most Laredo freight capacity.
El Paso — Bridge of Americas	CLOSED	Cargo facility closed	Key El Paso freight crossing offline. Remaining crossings on "update pending" status.
Reynosa / McAllen	DISRUPTED	Bridges technically open	Key streets to bridges blocked by cartel. Intermittent access only.
Nogales (AZ)	DISRUPTED	Intermittent delays	Delays reported on feeding roads. Perishable goods (produce) affected.

## SYSTEM FRAGILITY SIGNAL: CUSTOMS OUTAGE PRECEDENT

On 18 February 2026 (4 days before the El Mencho operation), a customs system failure on the Nuevo Laredo side caused significant delays and temporary suspension of vehicle crossings at the World Trade Bridge and Colombia Solidarity Bridge. This demonstrates that border IT infrastructure is fragile, even under normal conditions. The current security stress elevates the probability of further system disruptions.

The practical interpretation for supply chains over the next 7–14 days: even when published wait times appear low at certain hours, the operational risk is “stop–go capacity” driven by upstream corridor interruptions in Mexico, unpredictable inspections and security posture changes, occasional technology outages, and carrier refusals to run western Mexico routes.

Published wait-time data should be treated as a lagging indicator, not a reliable planning input.

## 2.5 Industries and Sectors at Risk

Sector	Exposure	Impact Description
<b>Automotive</b>	<b>CRITICAL</b>	JIT supply chains are at severe risk. Parts from Asian suppliers via Manzanillo and Jalisco/Bajío delayed. World Trade Bridge closure eliminates primary Laredo freight crossing. If instability persists >1 week, U.S. assembly lines face line-stoppage risk (parts are “late,” not “lost”). Transport = ~24.5% of bilateral manufacturing trade.
<b>Electronics / High-Tech</b>	<b>HIGH</b>	Guadalajara (“Mexico’s Silicon Valley”) is a major electronics hub. ~22.4% of bilateral manufacturing trade. Air cargo disruptions at GDL and Manzanillo upstream delays compounding. Semiconductors exposed to extortion diversification.
<b>Agriculture / Food</b>	<b>HIGH</b>	Michoacán and Jalisco directly in affected zone. Growers have suspended shipments of perishable goods including limes, mixed berries, and green onions. Cartel extortion of agricultural producers >US\$1.1B/year. Nogales crossing experiencing intermittent delays affecting produce flows.
<b>Pharma / Life Sciences</b>	<b>MODERATE-HIGH</b>	Temperature-sensitive shipments require unbroken cold chains. Road/airport disruptions create spoilage risk. CANACAR warns of impacts to nationwide medicine distribution.
<b>Energy / Mining</b>	<b>MODERATE</b>	Fuel theft from Pemex pipelines cost MX\$55B during previous administration. Mining and energy sectors heavily infiltrated by cartel extortion. Disrupted highways affect fuel distribution.
<b>Tourism / Hospitality</b>	<b>SEVERE</b>	Puerto Vallarta paralyzed. FIFA World Cup in June with Guadalajara as host city. Multiple airlines suspended flights. U.S. State Department shelter-in-place for 5 states. 1,000+ visitors stranded at Guadalajara Zoo.

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### 3. Cascading Effects: How Disruption Propagates

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#### 3.1 Mexico Domestic Cascade

**Stage 1 — Port congestion:** Manzanillo closure and slow-reopen operations create container yard buildup. Vessels may skip calls or reorder schedules, creating downstream delays at connected ports (Lázaro Cárdenas, LA–Long Beach, Balboa).

**Stage 2 — Inland blockage:** Blocked Manzanillo–Guadalajara corridors prevent container evacuation to manufacturing and distribution hubs. Containers accumulate in-yard with nowhere to go.

**Stage 3 — Manufacturing interruption:** Jalisco, Michoacán, and Guanajuato factories face input shortages and workforce disruptions. Reduced outbound finished goods and parts to the United States.

**Stage 4 — Border irregularity:** Crossings see irregular arrival patterns (“surge then gaps”), tightening carrier capacity and raising spot costs. Key commercial bridges closed, funneling traffic through fewer lanes.

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#### 3.2 U.S. Cascade: Where U.S. Plants Are Impacted

Automotive and electronics, which depend on frequent cross-border replenishment and parts that may enter Mexico via Manzanillo, are high-risk. If western Mexico instability persists beyond one week, U.S. assembly lines relying on Mexico-sourced parts face increasing risk of line stoppages. The parts are “late,” not necessarily “lost” — but for JIT manufacturing, late is functionally equivalent to lost.

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#### 3.3 Financial & Compliance Cascade

Enhanced scrutiny and compliance obligations tied to U.S. cartel FTO designations increase documentation and counterparty risk sensitivity in logistics and payments. The practical impact is slower carrier/forwarder onboarding, stricter counterparty due diligence rules, potential payment delays where banks flag transactions touching designated regions. FinCEN’s \$200 reporting threshold for border-town cash transactions adds friction to routine business operations.

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### 4. Compounding Risk: U.S. Winter Storm Interaction

This security shock arrives while U.S. logistics is still normalising from the winter storm cycle (Northeast/Gulf disruptions, 22–24 February 2026). The combined effect compounds systemic fragility in two critical dimensions:

**Reduced rerouting flexibility:** While U.S. East Coast and Gulf gateways are clearing their own backlogs, shippers have less ability to absorb mode shifts from ocean-to-truck routing via Mexico (or vice versa). The normal safety valve, diverting cargo to alternate U.S. ports, is partially blocked.

**Equipment imbalance risk:** Winter storm disruption worsens container chassis and trucking availability in U.S. corridors. Mexico corridor delays simultaneously create border surges, amplifying shortages at inland hubs and border-adjacent yards. Drayage rates are already elevated.

**Net effect:** Even if each event alone is manageable, together they increase the probability of service-level misses and expedited freight costs in early March 2026. Supply chain teams should model the two events as a single coupled system, not as independent disruptions.

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## 5. Structural & Long-Term Risk

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### 5.1 Nearshoring Under Threat

Mexico's nearshoring value proposition collides with rising execution risk. Violence cost equivalent to 14.7% of GDP (2024) translates into higher operating costs, security spending, and location-specific risk premiums.

The IMF projected Mexico's economy to contract by 0.3% in 2025, a 1.7 percentage-point downward revision. Nearshoring investment is concentrated in regions with stronger security infrastructure, primarily the northern border states and the Bajío corridor. The current crisis will accelerate this trend.

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### 5.2 Cartel Diversification into Supply Chains

Protection rackets ("cobros de piso") extract an estimated US\$1.1 billion annually from workers, shopkeepers, farmers, and truck drivers. Cargo theft has surged across trade corridors. Analysts warn that as nearshoring expands, cartels will diversify tactics: threatening to impede shipments unless payments are made, disrupting electricity and raw material supply, "awarding" bids to cartel-connected suppliers, threatening to disclose sensitive company information, and leveraging inside knowledge for stock manipulation.

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### 5.3 Cyber Risk Convergence

Mexico accounted for approximately 55% of cyberattacks in Latin America in 2024, with losses exceeding US\$40 million. Drug trafficking organisations have leveraged AI and cryptocurrency for online scams and extortion, including deepfakes impersonating legitimate businesses. Nuevo León state accounted for at least 25% of cyberattack attempts nationwide. Cyberattacks against government institutions are estimated to increase by up to 250%.

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### 5.4 Regulatory & Compliance Exposure

The FTO designation creates direct compliance obligations for any company transacting in or through Mexico. Material support liability could capture businesses that inadvertently make payments to cartel-connected entities through protection rackets or extortion. The USMCA review in 2026 adds further regulatory uncertainty.

## 6. Scenario Outlook (Next 2–8 Weeks)

Scenario	Probability	Timeline	Supply Chain Impact
<b>Rapid Stabilization</b>	<b>LOW-MODERATE</b> (25–35%)	Violence subsides 1–2 weeks; logistics normalise 3–4 weeks. Manzanillo backlog clears by mid–late March.	Short-term disruption. Backlogs clear. Insurance spikes temporarily. Contingency planning sufficient.
<b>Protracted Succession War</b>	<b>MODERATE-HIGH</b> (40–50%)	Regional CJNG commanders contest power over 3–6 months. Manzanillo corridor becomes a recurring chokepoint.	Sustained western Mexico disruptions. JIT rerouting required. Manufacturing shifts toward northern states. Insurance costs escalate. Carriers reroute to Lázaro Cárdenas, straining that node.
<b>Total War / State Confrontation</b>	<b>LOW (15–20%)</b>	CJNG targets government infrastructure systematically over weeks–months.	Severe nationwide disruption. Multiple port/airport closures. Force majeure triggers. Nearshoring investment freezes.

The most probable scenario is protracted instability in western Mexico as CJNG regional commanders compete for succession, mirroring the pattern after El Mayo Zambada’s 2024 capture. When compounded with the U.S. winter storm tail, even the “rapid stabilisation” scenario carries cost overruns through early March.

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## Summary

### BOTTOM LINE FOR DECISION-MAKERS

The killing of CJNG leader El Mencho on 22 February 2026 has created a security shock that is propagating through Mexico's trade infrastructure at three levels simultaneously: port operations, inland corridors, and border crossings.

This is a systemic constraint chain affecting Mexico's primary Pacific logistics axis when U.S. logistics capacity is reduced by the East Coast winter storm. The compounding of these two events elevates the risk of service-level failures and cost spikes into early March beyond what either event would produce alone.

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## Context

Since 22 February 2026 the security operation against CJNG leaders has triggered widespread violence across western Mexico. Road blockades and attacks have slowed or halted truck movements between the Pacific coast and inland manufacturing centres.

The Port of Manzanillo (UN/LOCODE: MX ZLO), which handles approximately 45% of Mexico's Pacific container imports and 20–25% of total maritime trade, temporarily closed on 22 February and reopened under military control with reduced throughput. Border-crossing capacity is more severely compromised than initial assessments indicated: CBP data shows the World Trade Bridge, Colombia Solidarity Bridge, and Bridge of the Americas cargo facility were all closed as of 25 February, leaving only Laredo Bridge II as a functional commercial freight crossing in the Laredo corridor.

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## Port network effects

IMF PortWatch data confirms Manzanillo's critical position in transpacific trade flows. Its primary upstream connections — Busan, Shanghai Yangshan, and Balboa — feed container ships that constitute approximately 62% of vessel calls.

Downstream connections to Lázaro Cárdenas, Los Angeles–Long Beach, and Yokohama mean that operational disruptions at Manzanillo ripple outward through vessel schedule changes, skipped calls, and delayed arrivals at connected ports. Short closures create multi-day recovery tails when inland evacuation is constrained, because containers accumulate in-yard with nowhere to go.

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## Border disruption

The border situation is worse than “tightening.” Key commercial crossings are closed or operating intermittently. A customs system failure at Nuevo Laredo on 18 February, four days before the security crisis, demonstrates underlying IT infrastructure fragility that elevates the risk of further outages under stress.

Carriers are selectively refusing western Mexico routes, compressing available trucking capacity at remaining open crossings. The practical operational pattern is “stop–go capacity”: published wait times should be treated as lagging indicators, not reliable planning inputs.

## Cascading effects on industry

The Manzanillo–Guadalajara–Bajío–Laredo corridor is the primary artery for automotive parts and electronics entering Mexico from Asia and moving as finished goods into the United States. With this corridor constrained at every node, U.S. automotive and electronics plants face increasing line-stoppage risk if instability persists beyond one week.

Agricultural exports from Michoacán and Jalisco are already affected: growers have suspended shipments of perishable goods including limes, mixed berries, and green onions. Pharmaceutical cold-chain integrity is at risk from road delays.

## Compounding with U.S. winter storm

U.S. East Coast and Gulf ports are still clearing backlogs from the 22–24 February blizzard, reducing capacity for redirected cargo. Equipment imbalances in chassis and trucking availability are amplified by simultaneous border surges from Mexico. When modelled as a single coupled system, these two events increase the probability of expedited freight cost spikes and delivery misses through early March.

## Looking ahead

If security operations stabilise within two weeks, Manzanillo's backlog could clear by mid-March and border flows could normalise with moderate variability. However, the most probable scenario (40–50% likelihood) is a protracted CJNG succession conflict lasting 3–6 months that keeps western Mexico corridors intermittently unreliable.

In that case, shippers will need to structurally reroute through alternate Mexican ports (Lázaro Cárdenas, Altamira) and border crossings (Eagle Pass, Brownsville), straining those nodes and prolonging supply-chain recovery. Even under the optimistic scenario, the combined tail of the Mexico security shock and U.S. winter-storm recovery means that supply chain teams should plan for elevated costs, reduced flexibility, and a higher-than-normal rate of service-level misses through at least mid-March 2026.

Key Metric	Current Value	Significance
<b>U.S.–Mexico bilateral trade</b>	US\$731.2B (Jan–Oct 2025)	16% of all U.S. trade; largest partner
<b>Manzanillo share of Pacific containers</b>	~45%	Single point of failure for Asian imports
<b>Road blockades (22–23 Feb)</b>	250+ across 20+ states	Most widespread coordinated cartel action in history
<b>Laredo freight crossings operational</b>	1 of 3 (Bridge II only)	~67% of Laredo commercial capacity offline
<b>Daily commercial trucks at risk</b>	20,000+ (Laredo corridor alone)	JIT automotive & electronics exposure
<b>Violence cost (annual)</b>	US\$273B / 14.7% of GDP (2024)	Structural drag on nearshoring ROI
<b>Cartel extortion (annual)</b>	>US\$1.1B	Hidden operating cost for all sectors
<b>Most probable scenario</b>	Protracted succession war (40–50%)	3–6 months of intermittent corridor disruption

## Sources & Intelligence Feeds

FreightWaves (24 Feb 2026) • CNBC (23 Feb 2026) • NPR (23 Feb 2026) • CNN (23 Feb 2026) • Al Jazeera (22–24 Feb 2026) • CBS News (22 Feb 2026) • NBC News (23 Feb 2026) • Crane Worldwide Logistics Advisory (23 Feb 2026) • DEA Cartels Intelligence • Control Risks Security Assessment • Crisis24 Mexico Cyber Report • Corporate Compliance Insights (FTO Analysis, Feb 2026) • Small Wars Journal / ASU (Cargo Hijackings, Apr 2025) • Mexexecution Nearshoring Outlook 2026 • SWP Berlin Policy Brief (May 2025) • Fortune (Extortion, Jul 2025) • IMF PortWatch (Manzanillo Port Profile) • U.S. CBP Wait-Time API (25 Feb 2026) • U.S. Census Bureau Trade Data • Dallas Fed (Mexico Trade Analysis)

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